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Abstract 
We examine the market quality effects of technology upgrades juxtaposed with 
short-sale bans. Between 2011 and 2013, the Spanish Stock Exchange introduced a smart 
trading platform (SIBE-Smart) and colocation to facilitate high-speed trading, and they 
also imposed two short-sale bans. We find that the SIBE-Smart introduction, which 
occurs between the two short-sale bans, leads to reduced market quality. The introduction 
of colocation, which occurs during the second short-sale ban, improves market liquidity 
although it does not attract additional high-speed trading. Our results highlight how the 
effects of latency-reducing infrastructure improvements depend on, and differ across, 
different regulatory regimes.  
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1. Introduction 
Technological innovations in the last decade have facilitated speedier trading. 
Whether modern markets with fast traders (often called high-frequency traders, or HFT) 
provide a net benefit to investors is actively debated, with evidence pointing to both 
positive and negative effects of speed on market quality.1 The ambiguity about the impact 
of technological improvements is a special challenge to regulators, who want to ensure 
that any proposed regulation curbs the undesirable effects without undoing the benefits. 
Additionally, exchanges that adopt latency-reducing technologies must keep in mind that 
regulations may impact fast traders differently from other traders. Therefore, data-based 
evidence on the impact of regulation and technological improvements in modern markets 
should be of interest. 
In this study we provide such evidence. Specifically, we examine whether 
technological enhancements improve market quality in the presence of trading 
restrictions. We exploit a unique setting that spans the interspersing of two short-sale bans 
with infrastructure upgrades and colocation on the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE). 
Specifically, the SSE imposed a short-sale ban (SSB1) on August 11, 2011, which was 
lifted on February 15, 2012. Soon after the end of SSB1, on April 16, 2012, the SSE 
introduced a smart trading platform (SIBE-Smart) that upgraded the trading technology 
to increase efficiency and reduce connection latencies. On the heels of this upgrade came 
a second short-sale ban (SSB2), imposed on July 23, 2012. While SSB2 was in effect, the 
SSE announced that it would allow colocation for high-speed traders. This initiative was 
implemented on November 12, 2012. SSB2 ended about three months later, on January 
31, 2013. The timeline below shows the chronology of these events. 
                                                            
1 See Section 2 for related research.  
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We conduct multiple event studies to investigate how various dimensions of market 
quality – liquidity, volatility, price efficiency, returns to liquidity provision, and adverse 
selection – are affected by the interaction of the technological upgrades with short-sale 
restrictions. Our event windows are designed to capture both the short-term and the long-
term effects of the technology upgrades. The continuous electronic limit order book 
structure of the SSE is similar to many other equity markets around the world, so our 
results should be relevant to a broad set of other markets as well. 
Short-sale bans are often used to limit precipitous price declines, although studies 
show that they have limited efficacy (Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2016; 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013). But whether the effects of short-sale bans are 
alleviated or exacerbated by improvements in trading technology has not been explicitly 
tested. Our study addresses this issue by tracking market quality changes as the SSE 
adopts infrastructure upgrades juxtaposed with regulatory short-sale bans.  
We use the timeline of events on the SSE to examine several questions. Do the 
expected positive effects of technological upgrades on market quality overcome the 
negative impact of short-sale bans? Do short-sale bans have a more profound effect on 
market quality in a low-latency environment? Or do regulatory restrictions outweigh the 
positive effects of technological upgrades, thereby exacerbating the negative effects of 
short-sale bans? We address these questions by analyzing short- and long-horizon 
Jan. 31, 2013
SSB#2 ends
July 23, 2012
SSB#2 starts
Nov. 12, 2012
Colocation
April 16, 2012
SIBE-Smart 
launch
Feb. 15, 2012
SSB#1 ends
Aug. 11, 2011
SSB#1 starts
June 30, 2013
Sample period 
ends
Feb. 1, 2011
Sample period 
starts
SSB#2SSB#1
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windows surrounding the introduction of the smart trading platform (SIBE-Smart) and 
colocation juxtaposed with the two short-sale bans.  
We document several novel findings. The SIBE-Smart trading platform 
introduction, which occurs after the first short-sale ban ends and before the second short-
sale ban begins, is accompanied by an across-the-board deterioration of liquidity 
measures as well as reduced high-speed trading and quoting activity in the short run. In 
the long run some of the trading decline is reversed, but market quality does not improve. 
In our short-window analysis, the colocation event, which is announced during the second 
short-sale ban, is accompanied by a reduction in high-speed trading activity and liquidity. 
In the long-window analysis, we find that colocation significantly improves liquidity and 
reduces adverse selection costs, but it does not attract additional high-speed trading.  
Comparing the periods before and after all of these events (SIBE-Smart, colocation, 
and the two short-sale bans), we find that liquidity worsens: Effective spreads increase, 
order book elasticity falls, and trading volume declines. In addition, return autocorrelation 
increases as does the price impact of trades. Finally, we find no overall increase in high-
speed trading activity. Thus, when viewed over the entire sample period, the negative 
effects of the short-sale bans outweigh the positive effects of the technology upgrades, 
although when considered in isolation, colocation had a generally positive impact on 
market quality.  
Taken together, these results indicate that the effects of latency-reducing 
infrastructure upgrades critically depend on the regulatory regimes within which they are 
implemented. Unlike previous studies that examine technological upgrades in markets 
without regulatory impediments, we do not find that such enhancements necessarily 
attract high-speed traders and improve market liquidity. For the SIBE-Smart introduction, 
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which happens at a time when there is widespread expectation of an impending short-sale 
ban, there are no market quality improvements. In contrast, the introduction of colocation, 
which happens while a short-sale ban is in effect, improves market quality although it 
does not attract additional fast trading.  
In addition to highlighting the important role of regulation in the relationship 
between technology upgrades and market quality, our results also underscore the 
importance of non-U.S. market settings in arriving at conclusions about the effect of 
regulations and trading infrastructure. There is an emerging body of literature which 
shows that many of the findings from U.S. markets do not generalize to other countries. 
We add to this international evidence on technological upgrades, regulations, and market 
outcomes.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of 
the related literature. Section 3 describes the institutional details of the SSE and discusses 
the timeline of events spanned by our sample period. Section 4 discusses the sample 
selection and market quality metrics. Section 5 provides methodological details. Section 
6 presents our results. Section 7 presents robustness checks, and Section 8 concludes. In 
the Appendix, we list our sample stocks and present additional results.  
2. Trading technology and short-sale ban background 
2.1. Technological upgrades, fast trading, and market quality 
As technological advances replace old trading systems with newer and faster ones, 
regulators face the challenge of adapting rulemaking to the new realities of modern 
markets. In March 2014, the SEC released a comprehensive review of the U.S. equity 
market structure, with half of the study devoted to reviewing the existing evidence on 
high-speed trading. Around the same time (April 15, 2014), European regulators imposed 
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tough regulations on high-frequency traders in the E.U. These rules include limits to keep 
price increments for low-priced stocks from becoming too small, tests of trading 
algorithms, and a requirement that market makers provide liquidity for a minimum 
number of hours each day.2  
Research shows that technological enhancements that facilitate fast trading have 
mixed market quality effects.3 Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) find that the 
introduction of Autoquote, which facilitates algorithmic trading, improves market quality 
by reducing spreads and adverse selection and improving the informativeness of quotes. 
Brogaard, Hagstromer, Norden, and Riordan (2015) find that although colocation 
provides informational advantages to HFT, overall market quality is improved after the 
introduction of colocation. Malinova, Park, and Riordan (2016) use data from the Toronto 
Stock Exchange to examine how regulation affects market quality by testing the impact 
of a tax on HFT. They find that quoted and effective spreads increase and revenues to 
liquidity supply decline, indicating that regulation that reduces fast trading may harm 
some dimensions of market quality. Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt, and Ysusi (2014) do 
not find any evidence of increased institutional trading costs as a result of increased HFT 
activity facilitated by technology upgrades on the London Stock Exchange. Brogaard et 
al. (2015) study a colocation upgrade at NASDAQ OMX Stockholm that improves 
connectivity of high-speed traders. They find that liquidity increases because high-
frequency market makers use the enhanced speed to reduce their exposure to adverse 
selection and to better manage inventory. 
                                                            
2 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140411IPR43438/html/MEPs-vote-laws-to-regulate-
financial-markets-and-curb-high-frequency-trading  
3 See also the review provided by the SEC at 
http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf (last access, July 13, 2016). 
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Other studies document negative market quality effects of trading technology that 
facilitates fast traders. For example, Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015) find that fast traders 
degrade the market quality of small stocks in a study that examines the introduction of 
colocation in multiple markets around the world. Thus, whether technologies that 
facilitate high-speed trading provide net benefits in terms of improved liquidity and 
increased price efficiency is still open for debate,.  
2.2. Short-sale bans and market quality 
Researchers agree that short sellers perform a useful function by incorporating 
fundamental information into prices. Or, as Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) put it: 
“For the most part, financial economists consider short sellers to be the good guys.” 
Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that short sellers detect financial fraud in firms about 19 
months before the misrepresentation is publicly revealed. In a similar vein, Desai, 
Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006) show that short sellers pay attention to firms’ 
accounting numbers and can anticipate earnings restatements several months in advance. 
Given the information-gathering role that short sellers perform, it is no surprise that 
market quality declines when regulatory bans are imposed on short selling. 
The 2008 recession and the European debt crisis in 2010-2011 saw several countries 
around the world impose ad hoc short-sale bans to try to stem price declines. In the U.S., 
the SEC issued an emergency order restricting naked short selling in July 2008, and 
followed that up with an outright short-sale ban in September. Analyzing the effects of 
this ban, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) find that market quality worsens because 
many algorithmic traders cannot act as informal market makers. With less competition, 
formal market makers can now charge greater rents for liquidity provision. Battalio, 
Mehran, and Schultz (2012) study a similar decline is U.S. stock markets following the 
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S&P downgrade of the U.S. in 2011. They find that short sellers do not amplify stock 
price declines during times of market downturn. 
The 2011 debt crisis saw the imposition of short-sale bans in Greece, Turkey, 
Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain. Similar to the U.S. experience, the evidence points to 
dubious efficacy of short-sale bans. Beber and Pagano (2013) study the effects of the 
2008 stock price decline in 30 countries around the world. Comparing countries that did 
not impose a blanket ban on short selling for all stocks to those that did, they conclude 
that the effect of such bans on stock prices is neutral at best. Bris, Goetzman, and Zhu 
(2007) analyze cross-sectional and time-series information from 46 countries and show 
that prices are more efficient in countries that allow and practice short sales.  
3. Institutional details of the Spanish Stock Exchange and timeline of events 
The SSE has four trading platforms: Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, and Valencia. 
Trading is linked through the electronic Spanish Stock Market Interconnection System 
(SIBE), which handles more than 90% of transactions. The benchmark index is the IBEX-
35, a capitalization-weighted index comprising the 35 most liquid Spanish stocks traded 
in the continuous market. Trading on SIBE is conducted from 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., with 
automated opening and closing call auctions from 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:30 to 5:35 p.m., 
respectively. During the rest of the trading day the SSE operates as a continuous electronic 
limit order book. Thus, the SSE trading protocol is similar to many other equity markets 
around the world, including the NASDAQ (U.S.), Xetra (Germany), the Australian Stock 
Exchange, and the National Stock Exchange of India. 
After the steep declines in equity markets across Europe (including Spain) in 2008, 
the IBEX-35 recovered remarkably to become Europe’s best performer in 2009. But 2010 
was a down year due to increased country risk and the weakness of the European financial 
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sector. The index fell 17.43% after fluctuating in a very wide range of 35% between its 
peak and low; however, the drop in share prices did not erode the levels of activity and  
2010 set a new record in SSE trading volume.  
In response to the European market declines, in mid-2011 ESMA issued a 
statement that all negative bets on financial stocks — in other words, short sales — would 
be curtailed in France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain effective August 11. This ban lasted 
until February 15, 2012, when the Spanish securities regulator, the Comisión Nacional 
del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), announced that the prohibition on short sales of 
Spanish shares under the EU Short Selling Regulation (EU236/2012) was no longer in 
effect after February 15. However, as many market commentators had anticipated, once 
the ban was removed, prices declined precipitously, leading the CNMV to announce that 
“European shares have been hit with extreme volatility that might cause the disorderly 
functioning of financial markets.” In response, a second ban was introduced (affecting all 
stocks) on July 23, 2012; it was subsequently lifted on January 31, 2013. 
During this time the SSE also introduced major technology upgrades to integrate 
better with the bigger European exchanges and facilitate high-speed trading. Two major 
technology changes that facilitated faster trading were an upgrade of the SIBE-Smart 
platform and the introduction of colocation. Recognizing that HFT in securities markets 
is extensive and a natural progression in the wake of the widespread introduction of 
electronic markets and the increasing use of computerized trading systems, the SSE 
committed to developing their trading infrastructure and communications technology. As 
part of that effort, they rolled out the SIBE-Smart platform on April 16, 2012, to better 
adapt SSE’s systems to new demands in terms of transaction speed and volume in the 
market. Following up on this technological enhancement, the SSE began offering 
colocation capabilities at its Data Processing Center in Madrid on November 12, 2012, 
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enabling trading firms to install their own trading servers in close proximity to the 
exchange's trading engines and real-time price distribution systems. SSE officials stated 
that these efforts were expected to reduce latency, increase capacity for traders, and 
directly facilitate HFT.4 Fortunately for our study, there were no significant changes in 
the SSE’s fee structure during our sample period (Chesini, 2012).  
4. Sample selection and market quality measures 
Our sample comprises the SSE-listed IBEX-35 constituents from February 2011 to 
June 2013. Due to index additions and deletions, our final sample includes 36 stocks that 
are index constituents throughout our sample period (see the Appendix for a list of the 
sample stocks). Our market data come from the SSE’s trade and limit order book (LOB) 
files. Trade files report all trades time-stamped up to the hundredth of a second before 
April 16, 2012 (launch of the SIBE-Smart) and milliseconds afterwards. For each trade, 
the record includes the price and size. 
The order book files contain snapshots of the five best ask and bid quotes of the 
LOB taken each time the LOB changes as a result of trades, order submissions, 
cancelations, or modifications. For each LOB level we have the quote record, the number 
of orders at that quote, and the displayed depth. The SSE allows iceberg orders, but the 
quote files do not provide information on hidden volume (see Pardo and Pascual, 2012).5 
Relatively large buy (sell) trades are allowed to walk up (down) the book. Thus, the trade 
price is actually the marginal price, that is, the price at which the last share of the trade 
was transferred. The minimum trade size on the SSE is one share.  
                                                            
4 See announcement at http://www.world-exchanges.org/news-views/bme-successfully-upgrades-spanish-
stock-exchange%E2%80%99s-trading-platform.  
5 We verify that there are no changes in detected hidden orders around the events we study; see robustness 
checks in Section 7.  
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Both the trade and the LOB files contain a sequence code, allowing for a perfect 
match between trade and quotes. Since there are no price improvements (i.e., trades inside 
the spread) and every trade consumes liquidity either at the displayed ask or bid quote, it 
is straightforward to assign trade direction (i.e., buyer- or seller-initiated). A trade is 
classified as buyer-initiated (seller–initiated) if it consumes liquidity at the offer (demand) 
side of the LOB, which is commonly called the quote rule. 
We filter out records from the opening, closing, and intraday short-lived call 
auctions in each file and use only quotes and trades from the continuous session. We also 
filter out prearranged trades.  
4.1. Liquidity and market activity measures  
We calculate a variety of proxies for liquidity and market activity. The effective 
spread (ESpr) is two times the difference between the trade t price (pt) and the prevailing 
quote midpoint before trade t (qt), multiplied by the trade direction (1 for buyer initiated; 
-1 for seller-initiated). In computing the daily measure, we weight each observation by 
trade size. The accumulated displayed LOB euro-depth (Depth) is the euro-value of the 
displayed depth at the five best levels of the LOB averaged weighting by time. It 
occasionally happens that spreads and depth give opposite signals on liquidity, such as 
effective spreads widening while depth increases. To summarize the net change in 
liquidity in such situations, we also calculate the two-dimensional liquidity measure LOB 
elasticity. We follow Näes and Skjeltorp (2006) and compute the elasticity of the bid side 
, and the ask side  and take the time-weighted average of the two 
to obtain the daily LOB elasticity (LOBElast).  ESpr is an inverse measure of liquidity 
while Depth and LOBElast are direct measures of liquidity. For market activity, we use 
b
ijLOBElast
a
ijLOBElast
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the following three daily measures: Vol is the daily volume in shares, Trades is the daily 
number of trades, and Vol€ is the daily volume in euros. 
4.2. Volatility and price efficiency measures 
Our metric for daily stock price volatility is the realized volatility (RVolat), which 
is computed as the daily standard deviation of one-minute trade price continuously-
compounded returns.  
We compute two daily proxies for price efficiency: the first-order autocorrelation 
of one-minute trade price continuously-compound returns ( ) and the pricing error 
standard deviation ( ) estimated using Hasbrouck (1993). For each stock-day, we 
estimate a bivariate Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model for , where  is the 
return of trade t and  is the signed trade size. We choose the optimal VAR lag using 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the model is estimated using OLS.  
is obtained from the coefficients of the Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation of 
the VAR model and the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. 
4.3. Realized spread and price impact 
We estimate the revenue to liquidity providers using the realized spread (RSpr) and 
measure gross losses to liquidity demanders due to adverse selection using the price 
impact (PrImp) of a trade, as in Huang and Stoll (1996) and Hendershott, Jones, and 
Menkveld (2011). The price impact of trade t is two times the difference between the 
quote midpoint prevailing  seconds after the focal trade (i.e., t+) and the midpoint 
prevailing right before trade t, multiplied by the trade direction. The daily average PrImp 
is weighted by trade size. The realized spread for trade t is computed as the difference 
idCorr
idPrErr
 , st tr x tr
s
tx
idPrErr
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between the effective spread and the price impact. Results are reported for  = five 
seconds; in robustness checks, we fnd that inference is unchanged using 15, 30, and 60 
seconds. 
4.4. High-speed trading activity measures 
The SSE dataset does not contain information about trader identities, nor does it 
indicate when orders or trades come from the same trader, so we calculate proxies for 
high-speed trading based on message traffic, quoting intensity, and cancellations (as in, 
e.g., Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011; Conrad, Wahal, and Xiang, 2015; Aiken, 
Aspris, Foley, and Harris, 2015).6 Our proxies are message traffic per volume in shares 
(MTVSh), message traffic to trades (MTTrd), cancellations to share volume (CANVSh), 
cancellations to trades (CANTrd), quote intensity to share volume (QIntVSh), and quote 
intensity to trades (QIntTrd). Message traffic is the number of LOB updates per day, 
which is equivalent to summing all order submissions, cancellations, and revisions. Quote 
intensity is defined as changes in either price or share depth at the best quotes of the LOB. 
We identify cancellations from LOB updates as follows. We first match the trade and 
LOB files using the internal sequence indicator to account for depth reductions due to 
order executions. The remaining LOB updates are classified into: (a) limit order 
submissions, when depth increases at any of the five levels from the previous quote; (b) 
limit order revisions, when depth increases at some levels and decreases at others, and (c) 
cancellations, when depth decreases at any of the five levels from the previous quote. 
5. Methodology 
                                                            
6 Note that our proxies do not capture the number of high-speed traders, but rather the amount of high-
speed trading in aggregate.  
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We estimate each event’s impact on our variables of interest by running pooled 
regressions. For the two technological upgrades (SIBE-Smart and colocation), we 
conduct our analyses over both a short window (five days before and after each event) 
and a long window (several weeks before and after the event of interest) because changes 
in trader behavior may differ in the short term versus the long term. We run long-window 
analyses for all of the events during our sample period.  
To aggregate high-frequency data for the short-window analyses, we face a tradeoff 
between the precision of estimates and the number of observations. We report findings 
with a 30-minute resolution for all metrics except PrErr, for which we keep the 60-minute 
resolution. Our results are similar if we use the 60-minute resolution for all metrics 
instead.7 For the long-window analyses we aggregate data at daily intervals.  In all 
regressions standard errors are double-clustered by stock and date using the procedure 
outlined in Thompson (2011). 
The short-window regressions take the following form: 
17
2
   

   it E it I it it
i
Y E I ,    [1] 
where Yit is one of the intraday market quality metrics defined in Section 4; Eit  is an 
indicator for the event under consideration (SIBE-Smart introduction or colocation) that 
equals one for the post-event period and zero for the pre-event period, and Iit are a set of 
16 dummies for each 30-min interval (we omit the first half hour dummy). The coefficient 
                                                            
7 Pricing errors cannot be computed with a 30-minute resolution. With a 60-minute resolution, 92% (100%) 
of the stocks have an average number of trades per interval greater than 100 (50) around the introduction 
of the SIBE-Smart. During the second short-sale ban, this percentage falls to 39% (78%) around the 
introduction of colocation.  
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of interest is E, which captures the difference in each dependent variable between the 
pre- and post-event period.  
Our model for the long-window regressions includes controls for potential low-
frequency confounds and takes the following form: 
6
1 1 1 1
2
          

         id E id V X D R s id id
s
Y E Volat XRet Yield SRisk ISect ,
 [2] 
where Yid is one of the daily market quality metrics defined in Section 4; Eid is an indicator 
for the event under consideration that equals one for the post-event period and zero for 
the pre-event period; XRet is the IBEX-35 return; Volat is the IBEX-35 volatility, 
computed as the daily high/low; ΔGBYield is the first difference of the long-term Spanish 
Government Debt yield; ΔSovRisk is the first difference of the sovereign risk of Spain, 
computed as the difference between the government debt yield of Spain and Germany; 
and ISect are industry sector dummies from the BME’s six industry sectors. We control 
for market-wide volatility because Cáceres, Moreno, and Rodriguez (2014) show that the 
short-sale bans on the SSE affect volatility. The remaining controls are included to 
account for industry, country-specific, and Europe-wide market condition changes. First 
differences are used for GBYield and SovRisk because standard unit-root tests indicate 
they are integrated of order one. All control variables are lagged one period. As in the 
short-window analyses, the coefficient of interest is E, which captures the difference in 
each dependent variable between the pre- and post-event period. 
15 
 
6. Findings 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Daily message traffic (which 
includes all updates to the limit order book) averages about 46,397 while average share 
price is 17.09 euros.  
[Table 1] 
In the first three subsections we examine each event individually: the introduction 
of SIBE-Smart (Section 6.1), the two short-sale bans (Section 6.2), and colocation 
(Section 6.3). In Section 6.4 we present the overall effects from before the first change is 
introduced to after all of the changes are completed, to determine the net effect of 
technology upgrades and the bans on market quality.  
6.1. Effects of the introduction of SIBE-Smart 
SIBE-Smart was introduced on April 16, 2012 to seamlessly connect the SSE with 
the other European exchanges and facilitate high-speed trading. According to the SSE 
(Bolsa, 2012), the SIBE-Smart introduction reduced latency from about 7 milliseconds in 
2011 to less than 1 millisecond.8 To evaluate the impact of this technological upgrade and 
the resulting faster trading platform, we compute and test for differences in the measures 
of various dimensions of liquidity and market activity by comparing the pre-SIBE-Smart 
(March 1, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and post-SIBE-Smart (April 16, 2012 – May 31, 2012) 
periods. Results are presented first for the short window (five days before to five days 
after) in Panel A and then for the long window in Panel B.  
[Table 2] 
                                                            
8 https://www.bolsasymercados.es/esp/publicacion/revista/revista.htm (last access: November 11, 2016). 
16 
 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that although trading volume and the number of trades 
increase, there is an overall reduction in liquidity with spreads increasing and depth 
decreasing, leading to a decrease in LOB elasticity. To ascertain whether this short-run 
effect is temporary and traders adjust to the smart platform over time, we next examine a 
longer time window surrounding the introduction of SIBE-Smart. Panel B shows that 
these effects are not reversed in the long run. The slight increase in trading volume and 
the number of trades over the short run peters out, while liquidity continues to worsen, 
with effective spreads increasing, depth decreasing, and LOB elasticity decreasing. The 
alignment of the short- and long-run results indicate that the introduction of the SIBE-
Smart platform leads to an unambiguous reduction in market liquidity, as measured by 
spreads, depths, and LOB elasticity, while not boosting market activity much.  
We next ask if there are any other benefits to this technological upgrade in terms of 
reduction in return volatility and/or improvements in price efficiency, in either the short 
or the long event windows. Results are reported in Table 3. 
[Table 3] 
Panel A shows significant increases in realized volatility, return autocorrelation, and 
standard deviation of pricing errors in both the short and the long windows. We do not 
find any evidence that the introduction of the SIBE-Smart platform helps improve the 
informativeness of prices by reducing pricing errors. Thus, our results are different from 
Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012), who find that prices become more efficient after a 
technology upgrade on the Deutsche Boerse.  
In Panel B of Table 3 we examine the effect of this technological upgrade on the 
realized spreads and price impacts of trades. In both the short- and long-window analyses, 
realized spreads and price impacts increase. Thus the increase in effective spreads 
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documented in Table 2 (Panel A for short and Panel B for long window) are driven by a 
combination of higher profits to liquidity suppliers (realized spreads) and higher adverse 
selection (price impacts). Our results again differ from Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012), 
who find liquidity improvements due to a reduction in adverse selection after a similar 
technological upgrade. In contrast, and similar to our findings, Menkveld and Zoican 
(2017) find that for a NASDAQ-OMX speed upgrade, spreads increase, possibly due to 
increased speculative trading by high-frequency “bandits” who increase adverse selection 
costs. In our setting, it is likely that the effect of impending regulatory uncertainties (the 
second short-sale ban) countervails the positive effects of technology upgrades that 
accrue during normal times.  
Much of the literature on technological upgrades in trading traces the market effect 
of such improvements to the presence of fast traders. Thus we next examine whether the 
introduction of the SIBE-Smart platform succeeded in attracting high-speed traders (the 
SSE’s stated goal). In Table 4 we present results on the changes in our metrics for fast 
trading after the implementation of the SIBE-Smart trading platform. 
[Table 4] 
 In Panel A, we find that in the short window immediately after the event, fast 
trading declines by all measures. Over the longer window (Panel B) only two of our six 
high-speed trading metrics (QIntVSh and QIntTrd) show slight increases, while the 
message-traffic-based and the cancellation-based metrics show no significant change. 
Thus the evidence points to the SIBE-Smart trading platform having only modest, if any, 
success in attracting high-speed trading even over the longer run. 
Overall, the results are consistent with liquidity reduction in the SSE stocks during 
this period in spite of the introduction of the SIBE-Smart platform. Perhaps worries about 
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the impending second short-sale ban weighed on the markets and led to the deterioration 
in market quality. Both the short- and the long-window results support the conclusion that 
the introduction of the SIBE-Smart trading platform generally did not attract additional 
fast trading.  
6.2. Short-sale ban effects under different latency regimes 
The SSE imposed short-sale bans twice during our sample period. The first ban 
begins on August 11, 2011 and ends on February 15, 2012, and it affects 16 stocks from 
the financial sector. There are no technological changes introduced during this ban. The 
second short-sale ban begins on July 23, 2012, and ends on January 31, 2013, affecting 
all the SIBE-listed stocks. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) hypothesize that the 
negative impact of short-sale bans on market quality should be exacerbated in a low-
latency setting. Our setting provides an opportunity to test Boehmer et al.’s hypothesis, 
as the latency-reducing introduction of SIBE-Smart occurs after the first short-sale ban 
and before the second. We thus evaluate the impact of the second short-sale ban on market 
quality relative to the impact of the first short-sale ban. However, while the second ban is 
in effect, the SSE introduces colocation on November 12, 2012. To control for this 
potentially relevant event, we limit the post-event period for the second short-sale ban 
from July 23, 2012 to November 11, 2012.  
As in previous tests, we use the pooled regression model of Eq (2), with an indicator 
for the second short-sale ban (SSB2), to capture the incremental difference in each 
variable of interest during SSB2 compared to SSB1. Our results indicate that all liquidity 
and market activity experience significant reductions during the second ban relative to 
their levels during the first ban. Return autocorrelations and pricing errors increase, 
indicating lower price efficiency, while realized volatility shows no change. We also find 
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increased realized spreads and price impacts during the second short-sale ban relative to 
the first ban. Thus our findings support Boehmer et al.’s (2013) hypothesis that a short-
sale ban imposed in a market with reduced latency exacerbates the negative effects of the 
bans on market quality. Finally, we find that four of our six high-speed trading proxies 
show a reduction and the other two show insignificant changes, indicating that relative to 
the first ban, there is an additional decline in fast trading during the second ban. The 
results of these tests, presented in Appendix Tables II and III,  show that while both short-
sale bans have negative effects on market quality, the second ban’s effects were 
comparatively larger in magnitude. We remind readers that while the first short-sale ban 
affected only financial stocks, the second ban affected all stocks. Hence all results in 
Appendix Tables II and III should be interpreted in that context. We further note that in 
Section 7 we report robustness tests that include only financial stocks. 
6.3. Effects of the introduction of colocation 
The SSE introduced colocation services on November 12, 2012 to futher facilitate 
high-speed trading. Prior research finds that colocation leads to improved market quality 
(e.g., Frino, Mollica, and Webb, 2014). The unique feature of the SSE’s introduction of 
colocation is that it happens while the SSE has a regulatory short-sale ban in effect. The 
second short-sale ban begins on July 23, 2012 and ends on January 31, 2013.  
In this section, we test for differences in market quality before and after colocation. 
As with the SIBE-Smart event, we examine whether this technology upgrade has a 
different impact in the short run versus the long run. We begin by conducting a short-
window (five days before and five days after) analysis and track changes in market quality 
immediately following the introduction of colocation. Results are presented in Panel A of 
Table 5. 
20 
 
[Table 5] 
In the short window (Panel A), there is no significant change in effective spread or 
depth although order book elasticity declines significantly. To examine whether these 
market quality effects persist in the long run, we next consider a longer event window. 
To clearly identify the effects of the ban and colocation, we include three time dummies 
in our regression: the first period from July 23, 2012 to November 11, 2012 is the pre-
colocation period while SSB2 is in effect (Pre-Colo&Ban); the second period from 
November 12, 2012 to January 31, 2013 is a time with banned short selling but availability 
of colocation (Colo&Ban); and the third period from February 1, 2013 to June 30, 2013 
is a time after the lifting of SSB2 when colocation is available (Colo&PostBan). These 
three dummies compare the incremental effects of SSB2 and colocation compared to the 
benchmark period April 16, 2012 – July 22, 2012, which is a pre-ban and pre-colocation 
period. These dummies together can provide a complete picture of how colocation affects 
the SSE stocks with versus without a short-sale ban. Results are presented in Panel B of 
Table 5. 
The coefficients on the Pre-Colo&Ban dummy show an increase in effective spreads 
and a decrease in LOB elasticity, indicating a reduction in liquidity after SSB2 is imposed. 
This negative impact on market quality is partly reversed after the introduction of 
colocation while SSB2 is still in effect. The Colo&Ban dummy coefficients indicate that 
effective spreads are still above the levels prevailing before SSB2 was imposed, but the 
depth dimension substantially improves. The LOB elasticity, which is a summary 
measure encompassing both spread and depth, shows that colocation improves liquidity. 
The F-tests comparing the Pre-Colo&Ban and the Colo&Ban coefficients confirm that 
the market quality improvement after introducing colocation services is significant, 
although there is no change in trading activity. The Colo&Post-Ban coefficients show 
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that once SSB2 is lifted and with colocation in place, market quality improves with 
respect to the pre-ban and pre-colocation period in terms of effective spread and depth. 
The F-tests comparing the Colo&Ban and Colo&Post-Ban coefficients confirm that 
effective spreads are significantly lower and LOB elasticity is significantly higher after 
the ban is lifted and while colocation is still in effect. 
 [Table 6] 
Table 6 shows that the effects of colocation on volatility, pricing efficiency, realized 
spreads, and price impact differ over the two horizons. In the short window (Panel A), 
volatility and price impact increase and realized spreads decline after colocation is 
introduced during SSB2. In the long window (Panel B), with respect to the pre-ban period, 
we observe no significant effect on realized volatility and the price impact of trades right 
after SSB2 is imposed (Pre-Colo&Ban dummy). Realized spreads increase and price 
efficiency slightly deteriorates. The Colo&Ban coefficients show that, once colocation is 
introduced, with the ban still in place, realized volatility and the price impact of trades 
both decline. Return autocorrelations increase significantly, indicating that price 
efficiency deteriorates. Realized spreads remain above pre-ban levels. According to the 
F-tests, the introduction of colocation with the ban in place reduces volatility and price 
impact and decreases price efficiency. Finally, the Post-Colo&Ban coefficients indicate 
that, once the ban is lifted and with colocation in place, realized volatility and price impact 
decline with respect to the pre-ban control period, with no notable effect on either price 
efficiency or realized spreads. Compared to the Colo&Ban period, the F-tests show that 
lifting the ban enhances the benefits of colocation in terms of lower volatility, with price 
efficiency and realized spreads returning to pre-ban levels. Overall, the introduction of 
colocation leads to improved market quality in terms of higher liquidity, lower realized 
volatility and price impact of trades, even while the second short-sale ban is still in effect. 
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 We also examine whether colocation helps attract high-speed traders to the SSE 
market, which was the SSE’s stated goal, in Table 7. 
[Table 7] 
 Panel A of Table 7 shows no significant change in high-speed trading in the short 
window. In Panel B, the long-window results show that the coefficients on the Pre-
Colo&Ban dummy are negative and significant for all six metrics of high-speed trading, 
indicating that compared to the pre-ban period, the period after the ban is imposed (but 
before colocation is introduced) sees a reduction in fast trading. The coefficents on the 
Colo&Ban dummy are also significantly negative for all of the high-speed trading 
metrics. In fact, the magnitudes are greater for these coefficients, indicating that high-
speed trading is even lower after the introduction of colocation. Thus, the introduction of 
colocation while the ban was in effect sees a reduction in fast trading. The F-tests 
comparing the Pre-Colo&Ban and the Colo&Ban dummies confirm this finding, with all 
of the coefficients statistically smaller after colocation than before colocation at least at 
the 5% level. Once SSB2 is lifted, in a regime with colocation facilities available, the 
Colo&Post-Ban dummy shows that there is no increase in high-speed trading with respect 
to the control period. Thus, the negative effects of SSB2 on high-speed trading are not 
reversed even after the ban is lifted.  
The results in this section show that unlike the SIBE-Smart platform upgrade, 
colocation has a generally positive effect on market quality. These contrasting results 
highlight how the regulatory regime can impact the effect of infrastructure upgrades on 
market quality outcomes. Finally, in the next section we examine the overall effects of 
these regulatory restrictions and the technological upgrades taken together. 
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6.4. Effects of all events combined 
In Table 8 we examine changes in liquidity and market activity (Panel A), volatility 
and price efficiency (Panel B) and high-speed trading activity (Panel C) on the SSE before 
and after the time window that includes all of the technology changes and short-sale bans. 
The pre-events period is from February 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011 and the post-events 
period is from February 1, 2013 to June 30, 2013.  
[Table 8] 
Panel A shows that liquidity declines on the SSE over this period. Trade-weighted 
effective spread increases and limit order book elasticity decreases. There is no offsetting 
increase in depth; in fact, depth shows no significant change overall. The market activity 
measures show similar patterns: Both volume in euros and number of trades fall.  
Panel B shows that there are no significant changes in volatility, pricing errors, and 
realized spreads, while return autocorrelations increase significantly. Price impact is 
significantly higher after all the changes, suggesting that informed traders are faring 
somewhat better in the post-changes period.  
In Panel C, most of the proxies for high-speed trading show no significant change 
from the pre- to post-event period; the exceptions are the cancellation-related metrics, 
which show a weak increase. Overall, there is little evidence of an increase in high-speed 
trading activity.  
Thus, the overall effect appears to be that over the longer run, the negative effects 
of the short-sale bans outweigh the positive effects of the two technological upgrades, 
although these efforts at facilitating greater automation of trading generate some short-
run positive effects (especially the introduction of colocation). 
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7. Robustness checks 
We validate the results presented in this study with a number of robustness checks. 
All of our results hold for the subset of Blue Chip stocks (defined as the seven stocks in 
our sample that consistently rank in the top ten stocks by market capitalization), which 
previous studies document are preferred by high-speed traders. Additionally, since the 
first short-sale ban affected only the financial stocks, we replicate all our results for the 
subsample of the eight financial stocks in our sample; results are qualitatively similar. 
One possible explanation for these similar results is a spillover effect from the financial 
stocks affected by the first ban to other stocks in the IBEX-35 index; for example, traders 
executing index strategies may curtail their trading in all index stocks even if only some 
of them are subject to a short-sale ban. 
We also separately examine the four Spanish stocks in our sample which are cross-
listed on the NYSE (tickers BBVA, REP, SAN, and TEF). Their trades on the NYSE 
make up very little of their overall volume: an average of 3% in 2011 and 3.6% in 2013. 
Running separate pre- versus post-ban tests for the first and the second short-sale bans 
yields similar inference, with the second ban showing bigger declines in liquidity. We 
also compute other share- and Euro-based metrics to proxy for high-speed trading, test 
additional proxies for liquidity, including Amihud illiquidity and quoted bid-ask spread, 
and compute realized spreads and price impacts at the 15-second, 30-second, and 60-
second horizons. For the long-window tests, we also run a sensitivity analysis by 
aggregating data at intra-daily frequency.  
To test that there are no changes in the level of hidden orders (which we cannot 
fully detect given the LOB snapshot data) around our information events, we construct 
two metrics.  RelHidTrades is the number of trades involving hidden volume divided by 
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the total number of trades; RelHidVol is the volume of trades executed involving hidden 
volume divided by the total volume. We then run the long-window regressions (Eq. 2) 
with these two variables as the dependent variable around the introduction of the SIBE-
Smart platform and colocation. The post-event dummies and the F-tests for the dummies 
surrounding colocation indicate that these hidden-execution-based variables did not 
experience significant event-related changes. All conclusions of the robustness checks are 
consistent with results presented in this study, and are available upon request.  
8. Conclusions 
Existing studies show that when exchanges provide technological upgrades, there 
are benefits in terms of improved liquidity and price efficiency, while at the same time 
the fast trading attracted by these upgrades may also adversely select other investors or 
otherwise harm market quality. Our investigation examines the key role of regulation in 
this equation. We find that whether exchanges can reap market quality gains by reducing 
latency depends critically on the regulatory framework within which technological 
upgrades are implemented. In this study we identify a unique timeline of events that allow 
us to shed light on how market quality is affected when technological enhancements are 
accompanied by, or enacted during, regulatory restrictions. 
During our sample period, the SSE introduced two major technological changes to 
attract high-speed trading: a technologically upgraded trading platform (SIBE-Smart) in 
April 2012 followed by colocation facilities in November 2012. During our sample 
period, there were two short-sale bans imposed by the SSE. The first ban ended just before 
the SIBE-Smart introduction, and the second ban started before the colocation event and 
ended several months later. We use this juxtaposition of events to examine how trading 
activity, market liquidity, and price efficiency are affected. 
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We document several new findings. We find no significant increase in market 
quality over short windows around each technology upgrade. Examining a longer 
window, we still find  that the SIBE-Smart introduction is accompanied by reductions in 
liquidity and price efficiency. The colocation event, which is introduced during the 
second short-sale ban, leads to liquidity improvements while the ban is in effect, and 
further gains accrue after the second short-sale ban is lifted. However, when we examine 
the overall changes in market quality from the period before the technological upgrades 
and short-sale bans to the period after, by most metrics, liquidity worsened and price 
efficiency fell. Furthermore, there is no increase in high-speed trading activity when 
comparing the periods before and after all these events. These results are in contrast to 
extant studies that document the unambigious positive effects of technological upgrades 
that are implemented in the absence of any regulatory restrictions.  
When regulatory restrictions are present, as in our setting, we find that the positive 
effects of speed-friendly technological improvements, documented in previous studies, 
may or may not accrue depending on whether these upgrades are preceded, accompanied, 
or succeeded by the regulatory bans. We believe that our results can inform regulators as 
they debate imposing trading restrictions in markets that have adopted technologies to 
facilitate high-speed trading.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Statistics 
We provide average daily statistics for our full sample of 36 stocks for the period February 2011 
to June 2013. We provide statistics on market capitalization; transaction price; volume in shares 
and euros; number of trades; relative bid-ask spreads; displayed depth at the five best levels of 
the LOB, both in shares and euros; the absolute open-to-close returns; the ratio between the 
highest and the lowest trade price, and message traffic. Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
 
Metric Cross-sectional average
Market Cap. (/10000) 1151334.09
(1721046.88)
Price 17.09
(16.82)
Volume (/10000) 551.43
(972.30)
Euro Volume (/10000) 4421.48
(7476.87)
Trades 2786.76
(2962.78)
Relative bid-ask spread 0.0016
(0.0006)
Depth 58181.41
(91080.94)
Depth (€) 385433.38
(353945.77)
Abs. open-to-close returns 0.0142
(0.0032)
Price high/low 0.0297
(0.0061)
Message Traffic 46396.96
(43541.41)
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TABLE 2 
SIBE-Smart: Liquidity and activity 
We evaluate the impact of the introduction of the SIBE-Smart on liquidity and trading activity. In Panel A 
(short window), we compare a 5-day “pre-Smart” period (April 5, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and a 5-day “post-
Smart” period (April 16, 2012 - April 20, 2012). High-frequency data is aggregated into 30-minute 
intervals. In Panel B (long window), we compare the “pre-Smart” (March 1, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and 
“post-Smart” periods (April 16, 2012 - May 31, 2012). High-frequency data is aggregated to obtain daily 
statistics. We present the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard 
errors. Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by trade size (x100) (ESpr); time-weighted quoted 
depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure while Depth and LOBElast are 
direct measures of liquidity. Market activity proxies are: the daily volume in shares (Vol) (/104); the daily 
volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). In both panels, the explanatory 
variable of interest is the dummy for the post-Smart period (“Post-Smart”). In Panel A, intraday dummies 
are unreported. In Panel B, control variables include the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily 
return (XRet-1), the first difference of the long-term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first 
difference of the sovereign risk of Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term 
Government debt yield of Spain and Germany, and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls 
are lagged one period. 
 
Panel A: Liquidity and Market activity - Short window
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 0.2155 *** 1334.59 *** 112.20 *** 43.81 *** 298.74 *** 205.05 ***
Post-Smart 0.0132 *** -76.14 *** -12.42 *** 6.37 *** 34.68 *** 18.77 ***
Obs. 6092 6061 6096 6051 6067 6055
Adj.-R2 0.1013 0.0194 0.0460 0.0158 0.0200 0.0306
F 69.86 50.92 118.20 25.72 29.01 55.03
Panel B: Liquidity and Market activity - Long window
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 0.1022 *** 1994.12 *** 218.56 *** 446.55 *** 34.55 *** 25.65 ***
Post-Smart 0.0424 *** -447.10 *** -36.81 *** 68.52 -1.31 2.03
Volat-1 0.0038 *** -70.67 -10.03 32.78 1.39 1.28
XRet-1 -0.0005 3.26 0.7362 -28.7640 -1.6388 -1.4805
ΔGBYield-1 0.0034 817.84 74.06 -41.57 -7.10 5.60
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0001 -6.4704 -0.5901 -1.94 -0.09 -0.14
Obs. 2139 2139 2139 2139 2139 2139
Adj.-R2 0.0686 0.0329 0.0573 0.0011 -0.0009 0.0033
F 35.68 14.77 26.05 1.31 0.51 1.98
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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TABLE 3 
SIBE-Smart: Volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impact 
We evaluate the impact of the introduction of the SIBE-Smart on volatility and price efficiency (Panel A), 
and realized spreads and price impacts (Panel B). In the long-window analysis, we compare the “pre-Smart” 
(March 1, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and “post-Smart” (April 16, 2012 - May 31, 2012) periods. In the short-
window analysis, we compare a 5-day “pre-Smart” period (April 5, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and a 5-day 
“post-Smart” period (April 16, 2012 - April 20, 2012). Realized volatility (RVolat) is the daily standard 
deviation of 1-minute trade price returns (x100). Efficiency proxies are the autocorrelation of 1-minute 
trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing error standard deviation (PrErr), estimated using Hasbrouck 
(1993). Price impact (PrImp) measures the informativeness of trades (adverse selection cost), and the 
realized spread (RSpr) measures how much of the effective spread is earned by the liquidity provider. Price 
impact and realized spread are measured over a 5-second horizon after the trade. The explanatory variable 
of interest is the dummy for the post-Smart period (“Post-Smart”). In the long-window analysis, we use as 
controls the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return (XRet-1), the first difference of the long-
term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first difference of the sovereign risk of Spain 
(SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term Government debt yield of Spain and Germany, 
and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls are lagged one period. 
 
  
Panel A: Realized volatility and price efficiency
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RVolat Corr PrErr
Cons. 0.1974 *** 16.379 *** 0.0367 *** 0.0879 *** 0.0676 *** 0.0226 ***
Post-Smart 0.0151 *** 0.745 ** 0.0040 *** 0.0340 *** 0.0136 *** 0.0102 ***
Volat-1 N/A N/A N/A 0.0073 *** -0.0013 0.0008 ***
XRet-1 N/A N/A N/A -0.0031 *** -0.0013 -0.0004 *
ΔGBYield-1 N/A N/A N/A -0.0256 0.0134 0.0063
ΔSovRisk-1 N/A N/A N/A 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 ***
Obs. 6103 6116 3225 2139 2139 2139
Adj.-R2 0.2057 0.0055 0.0753 0.1751 0.011 0.0712
F 138.85 1.99 44.06 95.47 5.76 35.48
Panel B: Realized spread and price impact
Variable RSpr5 PrImp5 RSpr5 PrImp5
Cons. 0.0581 *** 0.1248 *** 0.0390 *** 0.0543 ***
Post-Smart 0.0044 *** 0.0087 *** 0.0085 * 0.0230 ***
Volat-1 N/A N/A -0.0028 ** 0.0057 ***
XRet-1 N/A N/A 0.0001 -0.0007
ΔGBYield-1 N/A N/A 0.0289 -0.0297
ΔSovRisk-1 N/A N/A -0.0001 0.0002
Obs. 6102 6095 2139 2139
Adj.-R2 0.0548 0.0779 0.0979 0.3466
F 26.43 45.23 39.68 111.72
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Short Window results
Short Window results
Long Window results
Long Window results
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TABLE 4 
SIBE-Smart: High-speed trading 
We evaluate the impact of the introduction of the SIBE-Smart on high-speed trading. In Panel A (short 
window), we compare a 5-day “pre-Smart” period (April 5, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and a 5-day “post-
Smart” period (April 16, 2012 - April 20, 2012). High-frequency data is aggregated into 30-minute 
intervals. In Panel B (long window), we compare the “pre-Smart” (March 1, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and 
“post-Smart” periods (April 16, 2012 - May 31, 2012). High-frequency data is aggregated to obtain daily 
statistics. This table presents the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered 
standard errors. HFT proxies are: message traffic per volume in shares (MTVSh), message traffic per trade 
(MTTrd), cancellations per volume in shares (CANVSh), cancellations per trade (CANTrd), quote intensity 
per volume in shares (QIntVSh), and quote intensity per trade (QIntTrd). Message traffic is the total number 
LOB updates, which is equivalent to sum all order submissions, revisions, and cancellations. Quote 
intensity is measured by the number of quote or depth changes at the market quotes. The explanatory 
variable of interest is the dummy for the post-Smart period (“Post-Smart”). Intraday dummies are not 
reported. In Panel B, we use as controls the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return (XRet-
1), the first difference of the long-term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first difference of 
the sovereign risk of Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term Government debt 
yield of Spain and Germany, and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls are lagged one 
period. 
 
Panel A: High-speed trading metrics - Short window
Variable MTVSh MTTrd CANVSh CANTrd QIntVSh QIntTrd
Cons. 0.0787 *** 37.6219 *** 0.0324 *** 15.16 *** 0.0361 *** 16.57 ***
Post-Smart -0.0172 *** -5.4778 *** -0.0063 *** -1.52 ** -0.0076 ** -1.90 **
Obs. 6070 6068 5978 5963 5990 5980
Adj.-R2 0.0052 0.0067 0.0039 0.0027 0.0037 0.0041
F 32.72 42.15 24.25 16.88 22.79 25.45
Panel B: High-speed trading metrics - Long window
Variable MTVSh MTVTrd CANVSh CANTrd QIntVSh QIntTrd
Cons. 0.0491 *** 25.564 *** 0.0207 *** 10.757 *** 0.0223 *** 11.4821 ***
Post-Smart 0.0111 2.235 0.0042 0.976 0.0104 * 3.2497 **
Volat-1 -0.0010 0.416 -0.0005 * 0.084 -0.0003 0.3885
XRet-1 0.0015 0.436 ** 0.0007 0.200 ** 0.0009 0.3008 **
ΔGBYield-1 0.0288 4.669 0.0113 1.838 0.0067 -1.2651
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0000 0.047 0.0000 0.023 0.0001 0.0432
Obs. 2139 2139 2131 2131 2131 2131
Adj.-R2 0.0031 0.004 0.0024 0.0029 0.0116 0.0296
F 2.20 2.743 1.8988 2.1747 6.2343 15.0958
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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TABLE 5 
Colocation: Liquidity and market activity 
We study the impact of introducing colocation services on liquidity and trading activity. In Panel A (short 
window), we compare a 5-day “pre-colocation” period (November 5-11, 2012) and a 5-day “post-
colocation” period (November 12-16, 2012). High-frequency data is aggregated into 30-minute intervals. 
In Panel B (long window), we compare three periods: the “Pre-Colo&Ban” period spans from July 23, 2013 
to November 11, 2012, a time with banned short selling and no colocation; the “Colo&Ban” period spans 
from November 12, 2012 to January 31, 2013, a time with banned short selling and colocation, and the 
“Colo&Post-Ban” period corresponds to February 1, 2013 – June 31, 2013, a time with no ban but with 
colocation. The control period is April 16, 2012 – July 22, 2012, the time between the introduction of the 
SIBE-Smart platform and the ban imposition. In Panel B, high-frequency data is aggregated into daily 
statistics. We present the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard 
errors. Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by trade size (x100) (ESpr); time-weighted quoted 
depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure while Depth and LOBElast are 
direct measures of liquidity. Market activity proxies are: the daily volume in shares (Vol) (/104); the daily 
volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). In Panel A, the explanatory variable 
of interest is the dummy for the post-colocation period (“Post-Colo”). Intraday dummies are unreported. In 
Panel B, the variables of interest are the dummies for the Pre-Colo&Ban, Colo&Ban, and Colo&Post-Ban 
periods. We report F-tests comparing the estimated coefficients. Control variables include the IBEX-35 
volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return (XRet-1), the first difference of the long-term Government debt 
yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first difference of the sovereign risk of Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as 
the spread between the long-term Government debt yield of Spain and Germany, and industrial sector 
dummies (not reported). All controls are lagged one period. 
 
Panel A: Short window
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 0.2604 *** 809.13 *** 90.95 *** 19.44 *** 116.39 *** 84.87 ***
Post-Colo 0.0010 -21.99 -6.7141 *** 3.28 *** 0.0164 0.8856
Obs. 6037 6094 6082 6114 6115 6110
Adj.-R2 0.0477 0.0290 0.0477 0.0226 0.0312 0.0424
F 29.75 29.26 60.22 19.48 29.94 44.74
Panel B: Long window
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 0.1858 *** 731.087 *** 113.895 *** 72.883 9.452 *** 13.373 ***
Pre-Colo&Ban      [1] 0.0529 *** 51.049 -20.680 *** -199.413 *** -11.026 *** -11.570 ***
Colo&Ban             [2] 0.0269 *** 719.668 ** 18.817 *** -40.290 -10.508 ** -11.135 ***
Colo&Post-Ban     [3] -0.0170 * 542.303 ** 41.465 *** 17.259 -4.227 * -47.365 ***
Volat-1 0.0095 *** -36.107 -5.694 *** 35.405 *** 1.663 *** 1.655 ***
XRet-1 0.0003 44.885 ** 1.087 *** -1.832 -0.036 -0.253
ΔGBYield-1 0.0072 -180.819 11.633 ** -57.451 -5.199 *** -1.950
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0021 -0.3348 -0.0579 ** 0.1549 0.0131 -0.019
Obs. 10514 10514 10514 10514 10514 10514
Adj.-R2 0.2451 0.0595 0.2248 0.1942 0.1452 0.1690
F 287.499 83.83 351.61 173.028 197.656 198.592
Coefficient tests
[2]-[1] -0.0260 668.6195 39.4964 159.1226 0.5179 0.4353
F 6.7800 4.3000 33.2000 0.7800 0.1200 0.1800
p-value 0.0092 0.0382 0.0000 0.3782 0.7289 0.6755
[3]-[2] -0.0439 -177.3650 22.6481 57.5493 6.2804 -36.2302
F 45.2400 0.5200 34.1500 1.3700 7.8600 17.4900
p-value 0.0000 0.4699 0.0000 0.2413 0.0051 0.0000
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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TABLE 6 
Colocation: Volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impacts 
We study the impact of introducing colocation services on volatility, price efficiency, realized spread, and 
price impact. In Panel A (short window), we compare a 5-day “pre-colocation” period (November 5-11, 
2012) and a 5-day “post-colocation” period (November 12-16, 2012). High-frequency data is aggregated 
into 30-minute intervals. In Panel B (long window), we compare three periods: the “Pre-Colo&Ban” period 
spans from July 23, 2013 to November 11, 2012, a time with banned short selling and no colocation; the 
“Colo&Ban” period spans from November 12, 2012 to January 31, 2013, a time with banned short selling 
and colocation, and the “Colo&Post-Ban” period corresponds to February 1, 2013 – June 31, 2013, a time 
with no ban but with colocation. The control period is April 16, 2012 – July 22, 2012, the time between the 
introduction of the SIBE-Smart and the ban imposition. In Panel B, high-frequency data is aggregated into 
daily statistics. We present the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered 
standard errors. Realized volatility (RVolat) is the daily standard deviation of 1-minute trade price returns 
(x100). Efficiency proxies are the autocorrelation of 1-minute trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing 
error standard deviation (PrErr), estimated using Hasbrouck (1993). Price impact (PrImp) measures 
adverse selection cost, and the realized spread (RSpr) measures how much of the effective spread is earned 
by the liquidity provider. In Panel A, the explanatory variable of interest is the post-colocation period 
dummy (“Post-Colo”). Intraday dummies are unreported. In Panel B, the explanatory variables of interest 
are the Pre-Colo&Ban, Colo&Ban, and Colo&Post-Ban dummies. We report F-tests comparing the 
estimated coefficients. Control variables include the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return 
(XRet-1), the first difference of the long-term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first 
difference of the sovereign risk of Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term 
Government debt yield of Spain and Germany, and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls 
are lagged one period. 
 
Panel A: Short window
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RSpr5 PrImp5
Cons. 0.1560 *** 15.04 *** 0.0430 *** 0.0827 *** 0.1222 ***
Post-Colo 0.0072 *** 0.216 0.0012 -0.0072 *** 0.0060 ***
Obs. 6093 5998 2820 5993 6058
Adj.-R2 0.1143 0.0051 0.0286 0.0127 0.0529
F 58.90 1.80 14.57 6.10 26.70
Panel B: Long window
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RSpr5 PrImp5
Cons. 0.1218 *** 0.0688 *** 0.3482 ** 0.044 *** 0.1024 ***
Pre-Colo&Ban      [1] -0.0021 0.0005 0.1937 * 0.0377 *** 0.0008
Colo&Ban             [2] -0.0203 *** 0.0119 *** -0.0007 0.0354 *** -0.0205 ***
Colo&Post-Ban     [3] -0.0288 *** -0.0012 -0.0153 0.0050 -0.0214 ***
Volat-1 0.0124 *** 0.0020 *** -0.0442 * 0.0010 0.0066 ***
XRet-1 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0157 0.0011 ** -0.0009 *
ΔGBYield-1 -0.0144 -0.0075 0.3243 -0.0023 0.0044
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0009 0.0020 0.0014
Obs. 10514 10514 10514 10514 10514
Adj.-R2 0.2988 0.0094 0.0012 0.2548 0.275
F 343.42 8.78 5.94 350.38 300.06
Coefficient tests
[2]-[1] -0.0182 0.0114 -0.1944 -0.0023 -0.0213
F 15.2600 17.0600 2.0200 0.2400 38.8600
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.1554 0.6221 0.0000
[3]-[2] -0.0085 -0.0131 -0.0146 -0.0304 -0.0009
F 7.8200 16.7900 0.0400 88.4700 0.1300
p-value 0.0052 0.0000 0.8488 0.0000 0.7208
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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TABLE 7 
Colocation: High-speed trading 
We study the impact of introducing colocation services on high-speed trading. In Panel A (short window), 
we compare a 5-day “pre-colocation” period (November 5-11, 2012) and a 5-day “post-colocation” period 
(November 12-16, 2012). High-frequency data is aggregated into 30-minute intervals. In Panel B (long 
window), we compare three periods: the “Pre-Colo&Ban” period spans from July 23, 2013 to November 
11, 2012, a time with banned short selling and no colocation; the “Colo&Ban” period spans from November 
12, 2012 to January 31, 2013, a time with banned short selling and colocation, and the “Colo&Post-Ban” 
period corresponds to February 1, 2013 – June 31, 2013, a time with no ban but with colocation. The control 
period is April 16, 2012 – July 22, 2012, the time between the introduction of the SIBE-Smart and the ban 
imposition. High-frequency data is aggregated into daily statistics. We present the estimated coefficients 
from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard errors. HFT proxies are: message traffic per volume 
in shares (MTVSh), message traffic per trade (MTTrd), cancellations per volume in shares (CANVSh), 
cancellations per trade (CANTrd), quote intensity per volume in shares (QIntVSh), and quote intensity per 
trade (QIntTrd). Message traffic is the total number LOB updates, the sum of all order submissions, 
revisions, and cancellations. Quote intensity is measured by the number of quote or depth changes at the 
market quotes. In Panel A, the explanatory variable of interest is the post-colocation dummy (“Post-Colo”). 
Intraday dummies are unreported. In Panel B, the explanatory variables of interest are the Pre-Colo&Ban, 
Colo&Ban, and Colo&Post-Ban dummies. We report F-tests comparing the estimated coefficients. As 
controls, we use the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return (XRet-1), the first difference of 
the long-term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first difference of the sovereign risk of 
Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term Government debt yield of Spain and 
Germany, and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls are lagged one period. 
 
Panel A: Short window
Variable MTVSh MTTrd CANVSh CANTrd QIntVSh QIntTrd
Cons. 0.0575 *** 26.3340 *** 0.0212 *** 9.78 *** 0.0283 *** 12.42 ***
Post-Event 0.0018 1.7006 0.0005 0.49 0.0012 1.16 *
Obs. 6022 6054 6028 6051 6016 6039
Adj.-R2 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0011
F 0.43 3.45 0.23 2.05 0.66 7.79
Panel B: Long window
Variable MTVSh MTTrd CANVSh CANTrd QIntVSh QIntTrd
Cons. 0.0923 *** 37.2125 *** 0.0372 *** 14.9688 *** 19.6408 *** 0.0515 ***
Pre-Colo&Ban      [1] -0.0182 ** -7.2202 *** -0.0092 ** -3.7980 *** -3.7408 *** -0.0099 *
Colo&Ban             [2] -0.0322 *** -11.9315 *** -0.0146 *** -5.6536 *** -7.9533 *** -0.0208 ***
Colo&Post-Ban     [3] -0.0111 -4.0449 -0.0049 -1.7641 -5.9865 *** -0.0129 **
Volat-1 0.0006 0.1646 0.0003 0.0855 0.2072 0.0005
XRet-1 -0.0008 * -0.4090 ** -0.0004 ** -0.1745 ** -0.2119 * -0.0004 *
ΔGBYield-1 0.0063 3.9057 0.0029 1.7236 1.1283 0.0011
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0020 0.0041 0.0001
Obs. 10514 10514 10514 10514 10514 10514
Adj.-R2 0.1550 0.0787 0.1495 0.0820 0.1159 0.1393
F 195.03 99.94 173.27 99.30 107.81 175.45
Coefficient tests
[2]-[1] -0.0140 -4.7113 -0.0054 -1.8556 -4.2125 -0.0109
F 9.3600 6.2600 9.4000 5.9200 12.1300 13.9800
p-value 0.0022 0.0123 0.0022 0.0150 0.0005 0.0002
[3]-[2] 0.0211 7.8866 0.0097 3.8895 1.9668 0.0079
F 17.5500 6.2200 17.6500 6.8100 7.1700 15.8400
p-value 0.0000 0.0127 0.0000 0.0091 0.0074 0.0001
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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TABLE 8 
All events combined 
We evaluate the net impact of the technological upgrades and short-sale bans on the SSE from 2011 to 2012 
on liquidity and trading activity (Panel A), volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impact 
(Panel B), and high-speed trading (Panel C). We compare the “pre-events” (February 1, 2011 – June 31, 
2011) and “post-events” periods (February 1, 2013 - June 31, 2013). This table presents the estimated 
coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard errors. High-frequency data is 
aggregated to obtain daily statistics. Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by trade size (x100) 
(ESpr); time-weighted quoted depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure 
while Depth and LOBElast are direct measures of liquidity. Market activity proxies are: the daily volume 
in shares (Vol) (/104); the daily volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). 
Realized volatility (RVolat) is the daily standard deviation of 1-minute trade price returns (x100). Efficiency 
proxies are the autocorrelation of 1-minute trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing error standard 
deviation (PrErr), estimated using Hasbrouck (1993). Price impact (PrImp) measures the informativeness 
of trades (adverse selection cost), and the realized spread (RSpr) measures how much of the effective spread 
is earned by the liquidity provider. Price impact and realized spread are measured over a 5-second horizon 
after the trade. High-speed trading proxies are: message traffic per volume in shares (MTVSh), message 
traffic per trade (MTTrd), cancellations per volume in shares (CANVSh), cancellations per trade (CANTrd), 
quote intensity per volume in shares (QIntVSh), and quote intensity per trade (QIntTrd). Message traffic is 
the total number LOB updates, which is equivalent to the sum of all order submissions, revisions, and 
cancellations. Quote intensity is measured by the number of quote or depth changes at the market quotes. 
As controls, we use the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return (XRet-1), the first difference 
of the long-term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first difference of the sovereign risk of 
Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term Government debt yield of Spain and 
Germany, and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls are lagged one period. The explanatory 
variable of interest is the dummy for the post-events period (“Post-Events”). 
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TABLE 8 
All events combined (Cont). 
 
 
  
Panel A: Liquidity and trading activity
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 0.0923 *** 2170.815 *** 254.825 *** 411.935 *** 43.847 *** 23.958 ***
Post-Events 0.0231 *** -84.830 -33.037 *** 66.286 -20.045 ** -4.016 **
Volat-1 0.0056 *** -138.053 *** -11.723 *** 42.866 3.048 *** 2.025 ***
XRet-1 -0.2561 *** 5362.601 281.859 *** -798.821 -38.783 -34.972 *
ΔGBYield-1 -0.0366 -352.609 36.781 -223.366 -23.874 *** -4.350
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0003 *** 2.509 -0.169 *** 1.082 0.093 0.004
Obs. 7005 7005 7005 7005 7005 7005
Adj.-R2 0.0362 0.0026 0.0265 0.0012 0.0158 0.0048
F 52.24 5.93 39.31 2.47 22.54 7.34
Panel B: Volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impact
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RSpr5 PrImp5
Cons. 0.0790 *** 0.0623 *** 0.0124 0.0477 *** 0.0361 ***
Post-Events 0.0016 0.0078 *** 0.0319 -0.0036 0.0185 ***
Volat-1 0.0086 *** 0.0016 0.0092 0.0004 0.0048 ***
XRet-1 -0.2419 ** 0.1363 1.9533 -0.0212 -0.1577 ***
ΔGBYield-1 -0.0528 ** -0.0420 * 0.7585 0.0143 -0.0290 **
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0003 ** 0.0003 ** -0.0054 -0.0001 0.0002 *
Obs. 7005 7005 7005 7005 7005
Adj.-R2 0.0492 0.0072 -0.0001 0.1071 0.2579
F 60.38 11.24 0.84 169.37 198.24
Panel C: High-speed trading
Variable MTVSh MTTrd CANVSh CANTrd QIntVSh QIntTrd
Cons. 0.0421 *** 20.095 *** 0.0148 *** 6.957 *** 0.0182 *** 8.614 ***
Post-Events 0.0078 4.650 0.0050 ** 2.985 * 0.0031 1.315
Volat-1 -0.0002 0.210 0.0001 0.133 0.0002 0.203 *
XRet-1 -0.0752 ** -31.334 * -0.0305 -12.606 -0.0296 *** -13.901 *
ΔGBYield-1 0.0168 8.686 0.0072 3.830 0.0008 0.237
ΔSovRisk-1 -0.0001 -0.032 0.0001 -0.013 0.0001 0.002
Obs. 7005 7005 7005 7005 7005 7005
Adj.-R2 0.0033 0.0056 0.0093 0.0133 0.0029 0.0065
F 5.73 9.52 14.23 21.58 5.06 11.20
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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APPENDIX I 
List of SSE-listed stocks 
We provide the ticker(s), company name, industry sector (according to BME), and subsample 
classifications: “BC” means Blue Chip; “ADR” means listed as an ADR in the NYSE; “1STB” means 
affected by the first short-sale ban. 
 
  
Ticker Company name Sector Classifications
1 ABE Abertis Infraestructuras Consumer services BC
2 ABG Abengoa Basic materials, industry and construction
3 ACS Actividades de Construcción y Servicios Basic materials, industry and construction
4 ACX Acerinox Basic materials, industry and construction
5 AMS Amadeus IT Holdings Technology and telecomunications
6 ANA Acciona Basic materials, industry and construction
7 BBVA Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Financial services BC, ADR, 1STB
8 BKT Bankinter Financial services 1STB
9 BME Bolsas y Mercados Españoles Financial services 1STB
10 CABK-CRI Caixabank Financial services 1STB
11 DIA Distribuidora Internacional de Alimentación Consumer services
12 ELE Endesa Oil and Energy
13 ENG Enagas Oil and Energy
14 FCC Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas Basic materials, industry and construction
15 FER Ferrovial Basic materials, industry and construction
16 GAM Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica Basic materials, industry and construction
17 GAS Gas Natural SDG Oil and Energy
18 GRF Grifols Consumer goods
19 IAG International Consolidated Airlines Group Consumer services
20 IBE Iberdrola Oil and Energy
21 IDR Indra Sistemas Technology and telecomunications
22 ITX Industria de Diseño Textil, Inditex Consumer goods BC
23 JAZ Jazztel Technology and telecomunications
24 MAP Mapfre Financial services BC, 1STB
25 MTS Acelormittal Basic materials, industry and construction
26 OHL Obrascon Huarte Lain Basic materials, industry and construction
27 POP Banco Popular Español Financial services 1STB
28 REE Red Eléctrica Corporación Oil and Energy
29 REP Repsol Oil and Energy BC, ADR
30 SAB Banco de Sabadell Financial services 1STB
31 SAN Banco Santander Financial services BC, ADR, 1STB
32 SCYR-SYV Sacyr Basic materials, industry and construction
33 TEF Telefónica Technology and telecomunications BC, ADR
34 TL5 Mediaset España Comunicación Consumer services
35 TRE Técnicas Reunidas Basic materials, industry and construction
36 VIS Viscofan Consumer goods
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APPENDIX II 
Short-sale bans: Comparative effect on market quality 
We evaluate the relative impact of the second short-sale ban (SSB2), which affects all stocks, from July 23, 
2012 to November 11, 2012 (before colocation is introduced) to the effect of the first short-sale ban (SSB1), 
which affects only financial stocks (eight in our sample) from August 11, 2011 to February 15, 2012. We 
test for differences in liquidity and trading activity (Panel A), and volatility, price efficiency, realized 
spreads, and price impact (Panel B) in SSB2 versus SSB1. This table presents the estimated coefficients 
from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard errors. High-frequency data is aggregated to obtain 
daily statistics. Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by trade size (x100) (ESpr); time-weighted 
quoted depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure while Depth and 
LOBElast are direct measures of liquidity. Market activity proxies are: the daily volume in shares (Vol) 
(/104); the daily volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). Realized volatility 
(RVolat) is the daily standard deviation of 1-minute trade price returns (x100). Efficiency proxies are the 
autocorrelation of 1-minute trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing error standard deviation (PrErr), 
estimated using Hasbrouck (1993). Price impact (PrImp) measures the informativeness of trades (adverse 
selection cost), and the realized spread (RSpr) measures how much of the effective spread is earned by the 
liquidity provider. Price impact and realized spread are measured over a 5-second horizon after the trade. 
The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy for the second short-sale ban period (“SSB2”). As 
controls, we use the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return (XRet-1), the first difference of 
the long-term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first difference of the sovereign risk of 
Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term Government debt yield of Spain and 
Germany, and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls are lagged one period. 
 
Panel A: Liquidity and Market activity
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 0.1131 *** 1777.461 *** 191.664 *** 319.812 *** 29.897 *** 20.083 ***
SSB2 0.0636 *** -416.521 *** -35.779 *** -64.658 * -13.600 *** -6.969 ***
Volat-1 0.0118 *** -34.877 -9.895 *** 45.050 *** 2.625 *** 1.743 ***
XRet-1 -0.0008 35.867 ** 1.893 *** -8.166 *** -0.310 -0.322 *
ΔGBYield-1 0.0055 -247.178 *** 6.581 -142.775 *** -10.384 *** -5.154 ***
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0000 -0.300 -0.033 0.088 0.015 0.006
Obs. 7169 7169 7169 7169 7169 7169
Adj.-R2 0.1094 0.0219 0.0545 0.0058 0.0145 0.0210
F 132.51 46.52 83.13 5.92 23.22 29.78
Panel B: Volatility, efficiency, price impact, and realized spreads
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RSpr5 PrImp5
Cons. 0.0829 *** 0.0637 *** 0.1143 ** 0.0773 *** 0.0417 ***
SSB2 0.0083 0.0101 *** 0.2192 *** 0.0230 *** 0.0172 ***
Volat-1 0.0169 *** 0.0008 -0.0318 0.0013 0.0092 ***
XRet-1 -0.0029 *** 0.0002 0.0029 0.0010 ** -0.0021 ***
ΔGBYield-1 -0.0213 -0.0131 * 0.2015 -0.0042 -0.0015
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0001 0.0001 * -0.0005 0.0001 0.0001
Obs. 7169 7169 7169 7169 7169
Adj.-R2 0.1956 0.0080 0.0005 0.2431 0.2979
F 221.07 11.35 3.55 252.53 266.52
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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APPENDIX III 
Short-sale bans: Comparative effect on realized volatility,  
price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impacts 
We evaluate the relative impact of the second short-sale ban (SSB2), which affects all stocks, from July 23, 
2012 to November 11, 2012 (before colocation is introduced) to the effect of the first short-sale ban (SSB1), 
which affects only financial stocks (eight in our sample) from August 11, 2011 to February 15, 2012. We 
test for differences in high-speed trading in SSB2 versus SSB1. This table presents the estimated 
coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard errors. High-frequency data is 
aggregated to obtain daily statistics. HFT proxies are: message traffic per volume in shares (MTVSh), 
message traffic per trade (MTTrd), cancellations per volume in shares (CANVSh), cancellations per trade 
(CANTrd), quote intensity per volume in shares (QIntVSh), and quote intensity per trade (QIntTrd). 
Message traffic is the total number LOB updates, which is equivalent to the sum of all order submissions, 
revisions, and cancellations. Quote intensity is measured by the number of quote or depth changes at the 
market quotes. The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy for the second short-sale ban period 
(“SSB2”). As controls, we use the IBEX-35 volatility (Volat-1), the IBEX-35 daily return (XRet-1), the first 
difference of the long-term Government debt yield of Spain (GBYield-1), the first difference of the 
sovereign risk of Spain (SovRisk-1), measured as the spread between the long-term Government debt yield 
of Spain and Germany, and industrial sector dummies (not reported). All controls are lagged one period. 
 
 
Variable MTVSh MTTrd CANVSh CANTrd QIntVSh QIntTrd
Cons. 0.0538 *** 29.158 *** 0.0236 *** 12.879 *** 0.0240 *** 12.787 ***
SSB2 -0.0113 *** -8.883 *** -0.0072 *** -4.928 *** 0.0008 -0.928
Volat-1 0.0002 0.955 ** -0.0002 0.182 0.0001 0.427 **
XRet-1 -0.0017 *** -0.909 *** -0.0005 ** -0.207 ** -0.0006 ** -0.245 **
ΔGBYield-1 -0.0031 -0.509 0.0001 0.719 -0.0002 1.049
ΔSovRisk-1 0.0001 0.013 0.0001 0.003 0.0001 0.007
Obs. 7169 7169 7169 7169 7169 7169
Adj.-R2 0.0082 0.0422 0.0149 0.0564 0.0009 0.0079
F 13.43 58.93 25.56 92.95 2.80 12.74
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
